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FALSE IMPRISONMENT BY NONFEASANCE.
In the case of Whittaker v. Sanford, decided by the Supreme
Court of Maine in the summer of 1913, the defendant, Frank San-
ford, was the founder and leader of a religious sect, by which he
was regarded as the second Elijah, who was to have temporal
power over all the earth, and prepare it for the second coming of
Chirst.' The plaintiff's husband was a minister of this sect, and
the plaintiff herself had been a member for some years. The so-
ciety had two colonies, one in Jaffa, Syria, the other in Shiloh,
Maine; and they owned two sailing yachts, which served to trans-
port the faithful between these colonies. While in Jaffa, the
plaintiff had decided to renounce the sect, and to return to Amer-
ica by steamer. The defendant offered her transportation on
the yacht "Kingdom", and promised that her liberty should not
be restrained in any way. The jury found that after the arrival
of the yacht in South Freeport harbor, the plaintiff was detained
on board for nearly a month, by the simple means of refusing to
provide a boat for her passage to the shore; and that defendant's
influence over his officers and crew, who were all members of the
1110 Me. 77.
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sect, and over the plaintiff's husband was such that with them his
word was law. They also found however that no direct force or
threats of force were employed, and that the plaintiff was treated
as a guest, with due courtesy and respect. On these facts, the
form of action being on the case, the Supreme Court held that
Sanford was guilty of a false imprisonment. The Court held fur-
ther that while physical restraint is essential to this action, a force
exercised upon the person is not.
In the case of Herd v. Weardale Steel, Coal & Coke Co., decided
on appeal in the King's Bench in the summer of 1913, it was held
by a divided court that a mine owner's refusal to supply means for
the plaintiffs', his employees, who had wrongfully quit work, to
leave the mine, although the cage was idle for a short time dur-
ing their detention, was not false imprisonment.2
Here are two cases in which it is held, in the one by the full
court, in the other by a minority of the court, that when A is con-
fined on B's premises (to which position the act of B contributed
to bring him, although it does not appear that that is essential),
there is a positive duty upon B to extricate him. This duty,
moreover, does not arise out of any contract, but the breach of it
is apparantly a tort. Contrast this duty with the ordinary duty
not to imprison another falsely.
Judge -Cooley, in his treatise on "The Elements of Torts", de-
fines false imprisonment to consist "in imposing by force or
threats an unlawful restraint upon a man's freedom of move-
ment."8  Analyzing this definition, we find three essential ele-
ments, the restraint, the illegality, which must mean simply the
lack of just cause or excuse, and the means employed, which must
be force or threats. There is no doubt that the first two elements
were present in both cases stated above, and it is with the third
that we are concerned here. Let us examine a few cases, to see
how they have satisfied this third requirement.
In the case of Fotheringham v. Adams Express Co., the defend-
ant's detectives were in constant attendance upon the plaintiff for
about two weeks, and although they never laid hands on him, he
knew perfectly well that if he attempted to get away he would be
restrained.4 Here certainly we have positive physical acts, which
23 K. B. 771 (June, 1913).
8 P. 50, tit. False Imprisonment.
436 Fed. R. 252.
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-might well be dignified by the name of force, although none of
them were applied to the person of the plaintiff.
In Pike v. Hanson it was held that the mere words, "I arrest
you", if they actually constrain the plaintiff to some act of obedi-
ence, may constitute a false imprisonment.5 Yet here we have,
not a refusal to do something, but positive words, which might
well be interpreted as a threat of force.
It is also worthy of note that the proper form of action for this
wrong has generally been held to be the common law action of
trespass or its equivalent, which is further proof that some posi-
tive act is usually required. In view of this latter consideration,
we must attach a peculiar significance to the fact that Whittaker
v. Sanford was an action on the case. Although courts may
have extended the common law action of trespass to include posi-
tive acts which involve no direct application of force, they in-
stinctively shrink from applying it to a case where the omission to
do any act at all is the wrong complained of. The principal case
was one of pure nonfeasance, and the action on the case seemed
the most appropriate remedy. This, however, clearly distin-
gnishes it and the corresponding English case from all the cases
of false imprisonment hitherto decided. It is no longer a nega-
tive duty, the duty not to imprison another falsely, which the law
is enforcing, but a positive commandment. Wrongs arising out
of mere nonfeasance, though common in the law of contract and
quasi-contract, have been rare in the law of tort. An example is
the duty which the law imposes on the common carrier to receive
and transport the goods of all without discrimination. A few
other similar duties might be mentioned, which the law has im-
posed since early times. But the courts have been slow to create
new positive duties of this type. It has never been held that a
person was under a legal duty to lift a hand to save another from
death, even where it could be done with no danger whatever to
himself. But it is submitted that the principal case is a notable
step in that direction, and that, while the decision itself seems
sound, it is a radical departure from the established principles of
false imprisonment.
r9 N. H. 491.
6 Williams v. Ivey, 37 Ala. 244; Maher v. Ashinead, 30 Pa. St. 344.
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CHANGE OF NEIGHBORHOOD AS AFFECTING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
RESTRICTIVE COVENIANTS RELATING TO LAND.
As a general rule equity will enforce by injunction restrictive
covenants affecting land.' It is said that the theory upon which
such relief is given is the prevention of irreparable injury, but
courts have not been inclined to investigate very closely the extent
of the injury. It has been held that the mere fact that there has
been, or threatens to be, a breach is sufficient ground for equitable
interference.2 Equity, however, will take all the circumstances
connected with the breach into consideration and will not grant
an injunction if those circumstances show that it would be in-
equitable to do so.
One class of such cases is where there are building restrictions
imposed upon land owners to effect some particular design, and
there has been such a change in the character of the neighbor-
hood and character of improvements, that the original purpose
for which the covenant was entered into could not be carried out,
even if all parties were compelled to observe it. When such a
condition of affairs exists equity leaves the party aggrieved to his
remedy at law.
The New York Court of Appeals recently decided such a case,
Batchelor v. Hinkle,3 and refused to compel the observance of a
covenant, entered into in 1849, to set all buildings to be erected on
certain property back five feet from the street line to form court
yards in front of the residences, because the neighborhood since
that time had been so encroached upon by business that it was no
longer desirable for residences. The decision has met with some
adverse criticism from the har and it is proposed to examine it
and see if it is supported by authority.
*The right to specific performance of a contract, by the decree of
a court of equity, rests in judicial discretion, and may be granted
or withheld upon a consideration of all the circumstances. 4 In
such cases equity demands that a complainant seek redress in
1 Barrett v. Blagrave, 5 Ves. 55; Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige, Ch.
510.
2 Tipping v. Eckersley, 2 K. & J. 264.
3 Asheville Street Railway v. Ashezdlle, 109 N. C. 688; Batchelor v.
Hinkle, Vol. 50, No. 130, N. Y. Law Journal.
4 Seymour v. Delaney, 6 Johns Ch. 222; Margraf v. Muir, 57 N. Y.
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good faith and will deny him a remedy if he is in any way respon-
sible for the breach. If a vendor, having taken from each of sev-
eral purchasers of plots of building land, formerly the same es-
tate, a covenant to build only in a specified manner, has permitted,
without interference, material breaches of the covenants to be
committed by some of the purchasers, he cannot obtain an injunc-
tion to compel another purchaser to observe the same covenant.-
If a seller owns unimproved city property and conveys to one
party inserting in that conveyance restrictions designed to make
the section residential and preserve its fitness for that purpose, he
cannot compel the observance of those restrictions if he thereaf.
ter conveys to other purchasers without restriction, because he
has put it out of his power to carry out the plan of using the
propelrty for residences only.0 The complainant must never be
guilty of such laches in prosecuting his remedy as would lead one
to think that he meant to abandon his right to have the restrictions
observed.7 Nor may he have equitable relief if he himself has
done anything contrary to the spirit of the covenant.8 He must
show that the remedy he seeks would, under the circumstances, be
an equitable and just remedy, and where it will be of litle value
to the complainant and will result in great harm to the defend-
ant, it will generally not be granted. Courts will never compel
performance of a contract specifically when, looking at all the cir-
cumstances on both sides, it is apparent that injustice would there-
by be done.'
Where the covenant was entered into for a definite purpose,
but, owing to subsequent developments, that purpose cannot be
accomplished by compelling its observance, equity will not inter-
fere.' ° In Sayers v. Collyer an injunction was refused because
the character of the neighborhood had become so changed that
the original purpose-the keeping of the estate as a residential
property-for which the covenant had been enterd into, had
5Peek v. Matthews, (1867) L. R. Equity Cases 515.
6 Duncan v. Central Passenger Railway Co., 85 Ky. 525.
7Roper v. Williams, T. & R. 18; Orne v. Fridenberg, 143 Pa. St. 487;
Ocean City Association v. Schurch, 57 U. J. Eq. 268.
8 Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Eq. 325.
9 Miles v. The Dover Furnace Iron Co., 125 N. Y. 294; Clark v.
Rochester, Lockport & N. Falls R.-R. Co., 18 Barb. 350; Conger v. N. Y.,[Vest Shore & Buffalo R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 29; Starkie v. Richmond, 155
Mass. 188.
10 Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of the British Museum, 2 M. & K. 552.
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failed, and it would under the circumstances be inequitable to
enforce specific performance of the covenant." The Supreme
Judiial Court of Massachusetts laid down the same rule where
the restrictions were designed to make the locality a suitable one
for residences. The -Court said that, since the changed conditiofil
of the locality had resulted from other causes than breaches of
the covenants, to enforce them could have no other effect than to
harass and injure the defendant, without effecting the purpose for
which the restrictions were originally made. 12  In New York
there is a line of cases beginning with the well-known Columbia
College cases, which lay down the same rule, recognizing that
though a contract may be fair and just when made, yet a court
of equity ought not to interfere to enforce it, if subsequent events
have made performance by the defendant so onerous, that its en-
forcement would entail great hardships on him and cause little
or no benefit to the plaintiff.13 Other courts have also recegnized
the equity of this doctrine.' 4 The New York courts, however,
recognize that a change in the character of the neighborhood from
residential to business is not a reason for refusing specific per-
formance of the covenant, where it appears that the-covenant is
just as valuable for the latter as for the former.15
The decision in the principal case is undoubtedly sound and is
amply supported by authority but the Court unnecessarily makes
a statement in the last paragraph which has provoked adverse
criticism. It says that "a covenant may be enforceable by injunc-
tion against one person, and as to another violating the same cov-
enant an injunction may be refused." It is said that by this state-
ment the -Court introduces uncertainty into the law. It is submit-
ted that the statement of the Court is sound and only expresses
what is a fact, namely, that the law is more or less uncertain.
There may be two complainants who are entitled to the benefit of
a restrictive covenant. The one may have by laches or other mis-
conduct deprived himself of his right to an injunction but his
laches or misconduct would not affect the right of the other com-
"1L. R. 24 Chancery Division, 180.
12 Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496.
'1 Trustees of Columbia College v. Thatcher, 87 N. Y. 311; Ainerman
v. Deanie, 132 N. Y. 355; McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36.
14Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 186 Ill. 344; Page v. Murray, supra; Orne
v. Fridenberg, supra.
15 Zipp v. Barker, 40 App. Div. 1.
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plainant. The circumstances in the case of one complainant may
be such that equity would refuse to grant its extraordinary rem-
edy because to grant it would be inequitable but it does not follow
at all from this that the other complainant could not make out a
case where it would be equitable to grant an injunction. If the
circumstances are altered and one party is seeking an equitable
remedy against two violators of the same covenant, it is easy to
conceive that he might make out a great deal stronger case against
the one than against the other. He might be able to show that be-
cause of the violation of the one he was being greatly injured and
was entitled to equitable redress, but as to the other the circum-
stances might be such that, though the same covenant was being
violated, if equity interfered, it would only result in causing great
loss to the respondent without benefiting the complainant.
ACTION BY A WIFE AGAINST HER HUSBAND FOR A TORT TO TIlE
PERSON.
In the recent case of Brown v. Brown, (89 Atl. 889, Conn.) it
was held that, in view of the Married Woman's Act (Public Acts,
Conn., 1877, ch. 14), which had the effect of abolishing the com-
mon law unity of husband and wife, a wife may now maintain an
action for false imprisonment and assault against her husband,
such an action not being against public policy.
It is inevitably necessary, in reviewing a decision of so far-
reaching an effect to consider somewhat the development of the
rights of femes covert from the earliest times. At common law,
since the unity of husband and wife rendered it impossible for
the wife to sue the husband, it necessarily followed that she could
not sue him for a tort committed against her.' This was consid-
ered decisive of the matter, as indeed it was, but the dictates of
public policy, preventing such an action by reason of the sup-
posed consequent disruption of the home, were also often referred
to.2 Nor could a wife maintain a suit after divorce for a tort
comnitted during the coveture by her husband;3 for her dis-
I Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304; Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. 436, 1 Jagg.
Torts 463; Freethy V'. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641; Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182.
2 See cases cited supra, note 1.
3 Abbot v. Abbott supra; Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427; Main v. Main,
46 Ill. App. 106; Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281.
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ability did not-rest alone upon the necessity of joining the hus-
band, but upon the proposition that no right of action ever ac-
crued.4
Nor could a woman, either before or after divorce, maintain an
action against third persons who assisted her husband to commit a
tort against her during coverture. Such a suit could be main-
tained, if at all, only by joining the husband and he, of course,
could not join.5 The same principles were applicable to suits by
the husband against the wife but not to suits by the husband
against third persons.6 By the older law, moreover, a husband
might give a wife correction,7 within reasonable bounds ;8 for as
he was to answer for her misbehavior it was thought but just to
intrust him with the power of constraining her." The civil law as
to such correction went even further, allowing for gross misde-
meanors violent floggings with whips and rods. (Flagellis et
fustibus acriter verbare uxorem.) ;10but our latest state decisions
deny that even the power conceded at common law longer exists,"
although as late as 1868 the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
while not recognizing the right, refused to interfere in a case of
moderate correction.12
As to the contractual rights of married women the law was
more liberal, especially as regards the sole and separate estate. In
the common law courts, to be sure, contracts between husband and
wife were not recognized. 3 But if a separate estate was settled
on a feme covert equity would protect her rights, though they
arose out of contracts with her husband, 4 and where the distinc-
tions in procedure between law and chancery have been abolished
the logical result has been that wives may sue their husbands or.
4 Abbott v. Abbott supra.
'Abbott v. Abbott supra, Tiffany on Persons (2d. Ed.) p. 74.
6 Tiffany supra.
7 1 Hawk P. C. 2.
8 Moor. 874.
91 Black. Comm. 444
10 Schouler Dom. Rel. p. 72.
11 Gholston v. Gholston, 31 Ga., 625; Edmond's Appeal, 57 Pa. St., and
see the principal case.
12 1 Phill. 453. See State v. Oliver, 70 N. C. 60.
"3 National Granite Bank v. Wicher, 173 Mass. 517; Ellsworth v. Hop-
kins, 58 Vt. 705; Hoker v. Boggs, 63 II. 161.
14Kutz's Appeal, 40 Pa. St. 90; Bank v. Greene, 14 R. I. 1; Leahy v.
Leahy, 97 Ky. 59; Thorns v. Thorns, 45 Miss. 263.
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such contracts like any other persons."5 So also, where statutes
giving the power to married women to hold property free from
the control of their husbands have been passed, it is generally
held that a right of action against her husband was thereby given
a married woman for torts to her property.' Thus she may bring
replevin against 17 or sue for conversion 8 by her husband.
A more variable view has been taken of statutes changifng the
status of married women as to their power to sue generally on
contracts made with their husbands, in the absence of express
provision to that effect in the statutes. In the leading case of
Mathewson v Mathewson0 it was held, in construing the same
Married Woman's Act under discussion in the present case, that
a wife may enforce a promissory note given to her by her hus-
band and that the recitals in the Act giving her power to make
contracts with third persons did not negative her power to con-
tract with her husband. The Court remarked that "in enacting
this law the State adopted a fundamental change of public policy"
that, "by it the unity in the husband of his own and the wife's
legal identity was removed."
This position under similar statutes is supported by some juris-
dictions, 20 and denied by others2' according to whether or not
such statutes are strictly construed.
When, however, a wife seeks, by virtue of the Married
Woman's Acts or otherwise, to enforce a liability against her hus-
band for a personal tort the case under discussion stands alone.
As recently as 1913 it has been laid down as a general rule that in
no American jurisdiction can the wife sue or be sued by her hus-
band for a tort to the person.2 2 Thought many of the same juris-
15 Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437; Adams v. Adams, 24 Hun. 401;
May v. May, 9 Neb. 16.
'
5 Mason v. Mason, 66 Hun. 386; Ryerson v. Ryerson, 55 Hun. 69;
Chestnut ii. Chestnut, 77 II. 346; but see Walker v. Reamy, 36 Pa. St. 410.
17 Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129; Gillespie v. Gillespie, 64 Minn. 381.
is Mason v. Mason supra.
29 79 Conn. 23.
2 0 1n re Deaner, 126 Iowa 701; Leahy v. Leahy sitpra; May. v. May
supra; Greer v. Greer, 24 Kan. 101; Grubbe v. Grubbe, 26 Or. 363; Pearson
v. Pearson, 60 N. H. 497.
21 Roseberry v. Roseberry, 27 W. Va. 759; Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. St.
396; Kalfus v. Kalfus, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 839.
22 Peck on Doam. Rel. p. 123. See Frethy v. Frethy, supra; Longen-
dyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366; Abbe v. Abbe, 22 App. Div. 483; Band-
field v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80; Strom v. Strom supra; Peters v. Peters
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dictions which deny a tort liability concede that a husband may be
sued by his wife on her contracts and that the unity of husband
and wife which existed at common law is destroyed, the relief is
wife which existed at common law is destroyed, the relief is
withheld on another ground. It is said that the disability under
which the wife lalors rested not only on the principle that the
husband and the wife are one, but also on a sound public policy
which discourages the making of matrimonial bickerings a cause
of action for damages. 2  The arguments to this effect are prob-
ably summed up as well as anywhere in a Maine decision by Judge
Peters. He said: "We are not convinced that it is desirable to
have the law as the plaintiff contends it to be. There is io neces-
sity for it. Practically the married woman has remedy enough.
The criminal courts are open to her. She has the writ of habeas
corpus if unlawfully restrained. As a last resort, if need be, she
can prosecute at her husband's expense a suit for divorce. If a
divorce is decreed she has dower in all his estate, and all her
* * * * causes of complaint * * * * can be consid-
ered by the court and compensation in the nature of alimony al-
lowed her for them. * * * * With divorces as common as
they are nowadays there would be new harvests of litigation.
* * * * We believe that the rule which forbids all such op-
portunities for law suits and speculation to be wise and salu-
tary."
24
To this view there are several possible answers. In the first
place, since it is admitted that the legal unity of husband and wife
is dissolved, it seems necessarily to follow that the wife can sue
her husband as well for a tort as on her contracts with him. In
the words of the principal case, "if she can sue him for a broken
promise, why may she not sue him for a broken arm ?" The tech-
nical objection of joinder being removed, what is there to pre-
vent the suit? Stress is laid on the fact that nowhere in -the Acts
is it expressly provided that she may sue her husband in tort.
Yet though it was not so provided as to contracts either, that dif-
supra; Libby v. Berry, 74 Me. 286; Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 23 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 699; Sykes v. Speer, 112 S. W. 422; Schultz v. Thompson v Thomp-
son, per Day, J, 218 U. S. 611, 30 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1153; Harlan, Holmes,
and Hughes, JJ. dissenting; but see Schultz v. Schultz, 63 How. Pr. 181,
reversed without opinion, 89 N. Y. 644.
23 Blackburn, J. in Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. D. 436, and see Schouler
Dora. Rel. p. 79.
24 Abbott v. Abbott supra.
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ficulty was not allowed to prevent suits by a wife on contracts
against her husband. Once admit that the legal equity of the
wife is the same as before marriage, and the logical result ensues
that she may sue and be sued as a feme sole, even where her hus-
band is concerned.
Then, again, it is argued that public policy is a bar to such ac-
tions. But with that, strictly speaking, the courts have nothing to
do. If the technical legal right be clearly and manifestly given,
though by implication, the argument of public policy should not
stand in the path. Says Mr. justice Harlan, discussing such stat-
utes in his dissenting opinion in the Thompson case :25 "'With
the mere policy, expediency, or justice of legislation the courts
in our system of government have no rightful concern. Their
duty is only to declare what the law is, not what in their judgment
it ought to be. * * * * Now, there is not here, as I think,
any room whatever for mere construction. * * * *"
But conceding for the purpose of argument that the question of
policy may be inquired into, it is not apprehended that the disas-
terous results which in many decisions it is assumed would come
to pass, will be the result of allowing the action to be maintained.
Action of tort, between husband and wife, would, we think, be
confined, for the most part, to such cases as would justify the
bringing of the action. These statutes are remedial and, as such
should be liberally construed, if construction is needed.2 The
wife should not be compelled to resort to the criminal courts, or
be force, in the alternative, to bring a suit for divorce; to both of
which proceedings an inevitable stimga attaches, in order to ob-
tain redress.
It is therefore submitted that the view of the principal case is
correct, both as a matter of construction and as a decision in har-
mony with the spirit of the times. Indeed, it is difficult to see, hav-
ing due regard for the fact that in the Mathewson case the Act
was declared to have worked a fundamental change in the status
of husband and wife, involving complete equality, how the court
could logically have decided otherwise.2 7
25 218 U. S. 611.
28 Wolcott v. Pond, 19 Conn. 597; Hudler v. Goldon, 36 N. Y. 466;
.ackion v. Warren, 32 Il. 331.
27 See Mathewson v. Mathewson supra.
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE TO TAKE EFFECT UPON THE
CONTINGENCY OF A FAVORABLE POPULAR VOTE.
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated
by that department to any other body or authority.- It has long
been a mooted question, however, whether a legislative enactment
containing a provision that it should take effect only upon the
contingency of a favorable vote of the people amounts to a dele-
gation of the legislative power so as to render it unconstitutional.
At first, it was held that a referendum provision in a statute
rendered it unconstitutional, whether the statute was general or
local in character.2 Later, a distinction was drawn between such
laws as local option laws, laws providing for the government of
municipalities and for the annexation of territory, to take effect
in separate localities as the electors so vote, and those laws gen-
eral in their scope, aimed to affect the interests of the entire state
simultaneously when they shall have been voted upon favorably
by the electors of the entire state; and the majority of courts have
adopted the view that the referendum provision does not affect
the validity of the former, but that it does that of the latter ;3 al-
though some still adhere to the old rule.5 A few courts have ex-
tended the doctrine and hold that a referendum provision does
not affect the validity of either general or special laws,5 and this
principle was followed recently by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, three justices dissenting.6
"We see no difference in principle between making the opera-
1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, (7th ed.) 163.
2Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. Del. 479; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483;
Parker- v. Com., 6 Barr Pa. St. 507.
"In re O'Brien, 29 Mont. 530; Clarke v. City of Rochester, 28 N. Y.
McGonnell's License, 209 Pa. St. 327; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations
(7th ed.) 165 et seq.; see also State v. Hayes, 61 N. H. 264.
4 Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279; State v. Garver, 66 Ohio St. 555; Wright
v. Cunningham, 91 S. W.* Tenn. 293; State vt. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441; Win-
ters v. Hughes, 3 Utah, 443.
5Smith v. Parker, 26 Vt., 357; State v. Frear, 142 Wis., 320; see also
Queen v. Burah, 3 App. Cas., 889; Queen v. Carlisle, 6 Ontario Law Rep.,
718.
aHurspeth v. Swayze, 89 Atlantic Rep. N. J. 780. In some instances
the referendum provision is disregarded entirely. Robinson v. Bridwell,
22 Cal. 380, 392.
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tive efficacy of an Act of the Legislature dependent upon the con-
tingency of a favorable vote of the whole constituency of the
state and making the efficacy of an act dependent upon the favor-
able vote of a single county."' 7 As stated by the New Jersey court
at the outset of its discussion, "express power in the Legislature
to submit a statute to the people at large for adoption or rejec-
tion is not conferred by the Constitution, * * * * and such
a power is not expressly withheld from the Legislature." Con-
sequently, it is difficult to see how, even by implication, the Con-
stitution recognizes the distinction made by the majority.8
It is generally admitted that a statute may be conditional, and
that its taking effect may be made to depend upon some subse-
quent event.9 But it is insisted by the majority that popular ap-
proval expressed at the polls is not such a contingency as a law
may be made to take effect upon and that there is no analogy be-
tween such a contingency and that of a rebellion, insurrection,
foreign war, treaty, or the acts of a foreign power.9a "The event
or change of circumstances on which a law may be made to take
effect, must be such as in the judgment of the Legislature affects
the question of the expediency of the law; an event on which the
expediency of the law in the judgment of the lawmakers, de-
pends."' 0 To this an answer has been made that the expediency
of a law in the judgment of the lawmakers may depend upon
whether a majority of citizens entitled to vote at an election favor
it.11 Certainly a law which has not the support of public sentiment
is not likely to be enforced; and in view of the fact that in voting
for candidates at an election, the electors vote for those favoring
the principles which they desire enacted into laws, it would seem
proper, in a doubtful case, for legislators to consult the wishes of
their constituency upon questions of general public policy.'2
"The Constitution grants the power to legislate but it does not
confer knowledge. The very trust implies that the power should
be exercised wisely and judiciously. * * * * Instead of be-
ing contrary to, it is consistent with, the genius of our free in-
stitutions, to take the public sense in many instances, that the leg-
7 Wright v. Cunningham, supra.
8 State v. Frear supra.
9 Cooley's Cornstitutional Limitations (7th ed.), 165.
9a State v. Swisher supra.
30 Barto v. Hinmrod supra.
"Martin, J., in People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343, 410.
'
2 State v. Frear supra.
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islators may faithfully represent the people, and promote their
weifare." 'a "It will not be questioned, that it is entirely compe-
tent for the Legislature to provide for taking the vote of the peo-
ple * * * * upon a measure directly affecting them, and if
a given number be in favor of its adoption, to enact a law there-
for carrying it into effect. And there would seem to be little dif-
ference in substance in a reversal of the process by first enacting
the law in all its parts but providing that its operation is to be
suspended until it be ascertained that the requisite number of the
people to be affected by it are in favor of its adoption."'"
The New Jersey court supports its decision of the validity of
the statute before it upon the further, apparently well-taken,
ground that "where there are two permissible views as to the ex-
istence of a constitutional limitation, one favorable and the other
.. unfavorable, to a given statute, the courts must accord to the
Legislature the right to hold that view of the Constitution which
supports its enactment, even should the other view seem to the
court to be the preferable one."
The principle that state constitutions should be submitted to
popular ratification was not accepted by our first lawmakers, but
it was approved at an. early date and has become well settled.
1
There is absolutely no consensus of opinion in the United States
on the principle of discrimination between statute and constitu-
tional law, and the practice of referring statutes to popular ratifi7
cation would seem to constitute no real breach of our legal tra-
ditions. 6
LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATORY STATEMENT IN A PETITION TO A GOV-
ERNOR FOR A PARDON.
The Supreme Court of Texas in the recent case of Connellee v.
Blanton' held that, an application to the governor for a pardon
was an absolutely privileged communication, and therefore no
statement therein, although made with malice, would expose the
18 Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, 496.
14 Bull v. Read, 13 Crat. Va. 78, 88.
"15Dodd, Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions, 65.
16 Beard & Schultz, Documents on the State-wide Initiative, Refer-
endum and Recall, 18, 19.
1163 S. W. 404.
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signer to an action for libel. The reasoning of the court is sum-
marized in this statement from the opinion: "If the judicial pro-
ceedings which culminated in the conviction were absolutely priv-
ileged, why should not the same immunity be extended to the pe-
tition to a higher power to annul that judgment in part"?
The class of absolutely privileged communications is a very
narrow one, and has in general been strictly confined to judicial
proceedings,2 legislative proceedings, and acts of state.3 The rea-
son for limiting the class so strictly is well stated in the case of
Maurice v. Wordin :4 "The doctrine of absolute privilege is so
inconsistent with the rule that a remedy should exist for every
wrong that we are not disposed to extend it beyond the strict
lines established by a concurrence of decisions." The line how-
ever has not been so strictly drawn as to admit of no doubt on
the classification of such a communication as formed the basis of
the action in the Texas case.
A petition to the governor for a pardon is clearly not an act of
the state. Nor does it fall within the class of judicial proceedings,
which.have been defined in reference to the question of absolute
privilege, as proceedings carried on in a court of justice estab-
lished or recognized by law, wherein the rights of the parties
which are recognized and protected by law are involved and may
be determined.2 Under the class of legislative procedings are in-
cluded words spoken by members during a session of the legisla-
tive body ,and in some jurisdictions memorials and petitions to
the Legislature.8 The cases holding that memorials and petitions
to the Legislature are absolutely privileged rely upon the case of
Lake v. King7 decided during the reign of Charles the Second.
2 The general rule in the United States courts is that the statements of
parties, counsel, and witnesses made in the course of an action to be abso-
lutely privileged must be pertinent and material to the case. Smith v. How-
ard, 28 Iowa 51; Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. Mass. 193; White v. Carroll, 42 N.
Y. 161. The English rule is that the exemption from liability is absolute.
Henderson v. Broomhead, 4 H. & N. 569; Dawkins v. Rokeby, L. R. 8 Q.
B. 255, affirmed L. R. 7 H. L. 744; Seaman v. Netherclift, 1 C. P. D. 540.
3 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. 1023; Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223, 29 Atd.
473, 25 L. R. A. 106.
454 Md. 233 253.
•"Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223, 234.
6 Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyler Vt. 129; Lake v. King, 1 Saund. 131.
Wright v. Lathrop, 149 Mass. 385, held that such a communication was
only qualifiedly privileged.
7 1 Saund. 131.
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The alleged libel in that case was contained in a petition to a
Committee of Parliament, and it was held that no action would
lie because it was in a court of justice, thus in effect deciding that
such a petition was a judicial proceeding.
A petition to a governor asking for the removal of an officer,"
and a petition to a fire-marshal to institute an inquiry as to the
cause of a fire,9 were held absolutely privileged on the ground that
such petitions fell within the class of judicial proceedings. The
weight of authority, however, is that a petition to the proper au-
thorities regarding the conduct of public officers or relative to
the appointment of public officers is only qualifiedly privileged,
and is actionable if it contains defamatory matter and malice is
alleged.10 A c6mmunication to the governor of the state giving
information to inffuence his action on a bill which had passed the
Legislature was held only qualifiedly privileged."
The petition to the governor for a pardon seems more analo-
gous to those communications which have been held qualifiedly
privileged. A study of the reasons given for allowing absolute
privilege in the cases in which it has been allowed strengthens this
view.
Absolute privilege is allowed in judicial procedings on the
ground that justice requires that judge, advocates, and witnesses
have their minds uninfluenced by fear of an action for defama-
tion, that during a law trial advocates should not be embarrassed
or enfeebled in their efforts by fear of subsequent litigation, that
witnesses should be free to state what they believe to be the truth
without being constrained to withhold anything through fear of
an action for defamation.12 Absolute privilege is accorded to
legislative proceedings on the ground that matters relative to the
government of the state should be debated freely without fear of
litigation arising from words uttered in the heat of, debate.1 ,
Acts of state are absolutely privileged for the same reason applied
to legislative proceedings, namely, that there should be absolute
$Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 82.
9 Newfield v. Copperman, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. N. Y. 36G.
'oWhite v. Nicholls, 3 How. U. S. 266; Young v. Richardson, 4 Ill.
App. 364; Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R Pa. 23; see Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. &
Ald. 642.
11 Woods v. Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445.
12Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q. B. D. 588; Kennedy v. Hilliard, 10 Ir. C. L.
195.
,a Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1; Dillon v. Balfour, 20 L. R. Ir. 600.
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freedom of action in matters concerning the government of the
state. 4
Neither unhampered justice nor efficient government require
that a petition for a pardon, should be absolutely privileged. A
pardon is not an act of justice, it is an act of mercy, exempting
the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the
law inflicts for a crime he has cornmitted.'5 It would seem a
sounder view to hold such a petition qualifiedly privileged only.
14 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483; Chatterton v. Secretary of State, 2
Q. B. (1895) 189.
15 Moore v. State, 43 N. J. Law (14 Vroom) 203, 241; United States
v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150.
